Real Madrid 0-1 Atletico de Madrid (28/09/13)

12/02/2017

This is an analysis of one of the most impressive displays of Cholismo witnessed during Simeone's reign so far at Atletico. This was a match that helped them surge towards a famous league title, despite the win only taking place at the end of September. A Diego Costa goal was the difference between the two fierce rivals of Madrid. 

Atletico Lineup: 


4-4-2: Courtois (GK), Juanfran (RB), Miranda (RCB), Godin (LCB), Felipe Luis (LB), Turan (RM), Gabi (RCM), Tiago (LCM), Koke (LM), Villa (ST), Costa (ST)
4-4-2: Courtois (GK), Juanfran (RB), Miranda (RCB), Godin (LCB), Felipe Luis (LB), Turan (RM), Gabi (RCM), Tiago (LCM), Koke (LM), Villa (ST), Costa (ST)

Introduction

Firstly, when we are analysing Atletico's defensive tactics we must ask: what was their objective? Their objective was to deny Real Madrid opportunities to get the ball in behind their back four, isolate their Full Back's 1v1 (in turn Atleti's objective was to create defensive overloads around the ball), whilst denying Real players every possible opportunity to both penetrate and receive centrally. 
So, where did Atleti look to press (or win) the ball? Below is a simple graph displaying the areas (in red) where they would look to engage with Real Madrid: 

The aim was to, as a team, stay compact and force the ball into wide areas. With the picture below, it shows the 'high priority' areas of the flanks.

The reason for this being that if a Real player was in possession of the ball before these 'high priority' or 'high risk' areas, they weren't seen as a danger to Atleti- pressing the ball here would be seen as an opportunity where they might lose their shape and the midfield line could possibly become over stretched and leave gaps to play through. It would also see the possibility to allow Real Madrid to find 1v1 crossing opportunities in these 'high risk' areas.

These are examples of opportunities Atletico wanted to prevent exposing themselves to. Although this is in a situation where AM are recovering their defensive shape in transition, Ronaldo is with the ball and has a 1v1 opportunity vs Juanfran.

Another reason why the ball going wide in their own half didn't provide itself as an immediate trigger for Atleti was because Real were constantly attempting to create overloads in wide areas in an attempt to try and unbalance Atletico's shape and draw players out of position, and potentially take advantage of dangerous crossing opportunities.

Ultimately, their major priority was to ensure that if the ball was with the Real Madrid Centre Back's, that the Striker pairing of Costa-Villa was not penetrated. If it was, then this would trigger very aggressive pressing from either Gabi or Tiago. If the Midfield line was broken, then Godin or Miranda would have the responsibility to step out and prevent a free turn or pass in front of the back four. We will look at just how important the ST screen was to Atleti.

Di Maria 1v1 vs Felipe Luis, dangerous in-swinging crossing situation.
Di Maria 1v1 vs Felipe Luis, dangerous in-swinging crossing situation.

In the above situation the Strikers were pulled apart and Ramos was able to penetrate. But Tiago was excellent at recognising pressing triggers, and travelled with the ball to ensure that the only option for his opponent was to bounce the ball back, which in turn allowed the ST's to narrow off again and deny any central passes.

Atletico's Compactness

Atletico retained excellent compactness as a team by ensuring a number of simple objectives:

  • Retain close distances between each player per unit
  • Retain close distances between all three units (Strikers/Midfield/Defence)
  • Leave opposition Centre Back's free à Leave opposition Full Back's free when ball is with Centre Back's.

Observe the close distances between each unit (and each player):

 

Even if a line is broken, the next player does not have far to travel to prevent a turn or a pass. Notice how the whole team is defending the width of their penalty box when the ball is with a central Real Madrid player.

Leaving the Centre Back's (CB's) free was essentially an idea to not close down any player that received (ie CM dropping in between CB's) in front of the defensive block. 

This simply allowed Costa-Villa to perform screening duties of blocking any passes into the centre of midfield (we will look at their roles shortly). As a result, if a Real Madrid CM couldn't receive in between the lines, they would often look to drop and receive the ball in front of the block- in other words, not a threat to Atletico. If Ramos or Pepe were to try a risky pass in an attempt to break a line and it was intercepted, they could easily find themselves in a 2v2 situation on the counter attack.

Here, we see how Atelti have left the Full Back free as he is in front of the block.

Again, we can see (circled in Yellow) how many wide players have been left free to receive the ball. Atleti's midfield line is extremely compact, thus allowing these players to be free. As always, Ramos and Pepe are unchallenged, whilst Khedira and Illaramendi have both dropped in front of the block to receive, leaving Atleti with only 3 players left to man mark in their own half during this situation. 

Roles of each unit

Strikers 

  • The main priority for Costa & Villa was to block passes into central midfield. They did this by shifting across the pitch and remaining as central as possible. As they were instructed to leave the CB's free, they were more concerned about blocking passes into midfielders than threatening a pass back to the CB when the ball was with the Full Back (FB) of Real. In addition, when the ball was with an opponent FB in front of the block, the role of the Strikers was to stay in the centre so that when the ball was circulated the central screen was still in place.
    Below is an example of how the ST-screen forces play wide.

Below we see how Modric was trying to play in between the MF/ST lines of Atleti, however he is screened by Costa. 

  • Help create numerical equality or superiority for Atleti when the ball moved into wide areas where there was a potential 3v2 in favour of Real Madrid. The nearside Striker would move over and threaten or (usually) mark the nearest player that supported the ball from behind (below is an example).

With this situation, however, the ST (Villa in this case) doesn't look to get tight and press Illaramendi until the ball has been passed to Di Maria- by doing this he can cut off the option to circulate the ball as if Real Madrid were to do so, it could possibly over-stretch Atleti with their ST-screen being out of position. 

This was part of a wide pressing trap Atetlico employed.

  • To drop in to balance off the midfield when a wide-press was beaten and the midfield line became in danger of being over stretched.

In this scenario, it was usually Villa dropping in to screen passes, and prepare to drop into the midfield line in case Gabi or Tiago were dragged out. Below is an example were the ST's were dragged into a wide area to try and initiate a press, but the ball was circulated and Atleti had to react.  


The Midfield Line

The Midfield Line

As a unit the Midfield line was responsible for:

  • Staying compact
  • Sliding across quickly

  • Denying central passes
  • Supporting the defensive line (retain good distances)

Compactness

The midfield line showed throughout the match phenomenal horizontal compactness, playing with effectively four CM's. When the ball was central, the Wingers' in Turan and Koke would use their Full Back's in Juanfran and Felipe Luis as reference points; the objective was to be narrower than them. This meant that central penetration was unavailable to Real Madrid, and effectively forced them to play into wide areas- which is where Simeone wants his opponents to play.

As we can see here, Koke is inside to Luis, screening off a pass into the open channel between the Full Back and nearside CB. As we can see, the MF line possesses close distances between each player within it. Most notably the RW/RCM & LW/LCM constantly have a very close relationship (space-wise). This is a key aspect of Atleti's MF compactness; the nearest W/CM pairing attach closely when on the strong side, whilst the weak-side pairing stay close to cover space away from the ball.

Koke and Tiago narrow off to prevent a penetrative pass (for me on this, see Rondos article), whilst Gabi takes up a deeper position, whilst Turan stays close in anticipation for a switch of play.

Another excellent example of their horizontal compactness in seen below; benefiting from their ST-screen, the distances between Gabi-Tiago-Koke essentially allow them to double mark their opponents trying to receive within the block. Again, the ball is forced wide with no options to penetrate. 

Layers of the line

Tactically, this was of vital importance to Atleti. There are a number of reasons for its use that we will look at. It was so effective in this match. A layered unit is essentially how many lines of cover is provided; so in this case if the nearside CM covers his Winger- that is one layer- and if the farside CM takes up a deeper position than his nearside CM then that is now two layers.

We have to look at regular situations that they faced throughout the match. One of these was being positioned in their own half, but with no pressure on the ball.
When this situation occurred, the line would become 'layered' in an effort to: deny penetration, mark potential receivers, and to tighten distances between them and the defensive unit in preparation for a long ball. 

Here is an example of how the Midfield line adjusted when there was no pressure on the ball:  

The wide player has been left free, but there is a player to be marked centrally, meaning the line must adjust and the closest CM to the ball must drop to mark. This means that if the Attacking Midfielder attempts a 3rd man run out wide, the CM is in a good position to track the run. 

Gabi demonstrated great responsibility in tracking the runs of Ronaldo from Midfiled into the final 1/3.  

With more than one layer, the back four are rarely in danger of being isolated from midfield support.
With more than one layer, the back four are rarely in danger of being isolated from midfield support.

With Gabi taking up this deep position, he is in an excellent position to pick up any second balls that occur, whilst if the ball is switched and it is a 1v1, he can then quickly drop into the backline.

This positioning of the midfield line ensures the units coverage of the field is increased.
Note: With the two Striker's screening so effectively, this enables the line to become layered as, in Gabi's case- he is highly unlikely to have to step out and press.

By Gabi dropping to cover Turan, he creates a single layer in the line which ensures the line is not flat and as a result very hard to penetrate. 


Offering numerical support when defending crosses

Defending crosses is a huge part of Simeone's defensive gameplan. With the ball forced wide on so many opportunities his team must be prepared for every possible scenario when the ball enters the box. To understand why Gabi was so often tasked with the responsibility of dropping into the back line to restore numerical equality, or superiorirty. Layering the midfield like this meant that the distances between him (farside CM) and the back line were very close, allowing him to 'fill in'.

When the Full Back was tasked with engaging the opposition Winger in low areas in the Atleti 1/3 the nearside CB would follow him into a covering position. This left them very vulnerable from a potential cross.

The majority of crossing attempts from Real Madrid came from their right hand side with the idea to aim for Ronaldo/Benzema in the box.

Screening & Intercepting

Screening from the CM's came down, a lot of the time, the 'layering' of the midfield line. In other words, the CM's were seldom square with each other- always at an angle. This denied Real passes into teammates and open channels.

In this example, if the Winger was being forced inside then it was important the farside CM (Tiago) dropped deeper (add an extra layer) incase a pass became possible.
In this example, if the Winger was being forced inside then it was important the farside CM (Tiago) dropped deeper (add an extra layer) incase a pass became possible.

What happened if the Striker-Screen was broken? 

If the ST line was broken then this would trigger an immediate and aggressive press. This was down to the nearest player (zonal-man), being either Gabi or Tiago. 

The Defensive Line

 

It is worth noting just how strong each of the back four was/is in multiple 1v1 scenarios (approach from the front, side, behind, aerial). Despite being provided with brilliant protection from the Midfield line, when they back line had to defend 1v1 they were highly competent. 

Basic Unit Shape

Typically, the line was held roughly 5 yards from their own area. The control of the depth of the pitch relied on whether there was pressure on the ball or not. If the ball was in their own half and the opponent was unchallenged, the line would retreat to defend the edge of their area. Whether the line squeezed up, or dropped off, it was only a matter of yards each time as they were very deep all match- looking to deny Real any opportunities to exploit space in behind. As the line was so deep, it allowed the Full Back's to stay wider as it meant that enabled them to get out quickly to engage- or at least delay- the Winger, but also any attempts to play a ball in behind would either be covered by the nearside CB or go out of play such was the denial of space behind the line.

Note: With the Full Back's wide, we saw the Wingers' cooperation in screening off the space between the ball-side FB/CB.

When the ball was central, the Full Backs assumed wider positions than the Wingers. The Center Back's stayed close together.
When the ball was central, the Full Backs assumed wider positions than the Wingers. The Center Back's stayed close together.

The movements and positioning of the Defensive line were heavily in cooperation with the Midfield line (and visa versa). 

However, the line was adapted very well to counter Real Madrid's attempts at overloading the flanks. Once the ball entered into the final 1/3 of the pitch, the back line employed strict man-marking, and would follow the attacker (usually Benzema or Ronaldo) into wide areas. The close distances the Midfield line kept to the back four allowed for this to happen.

Juanfran would often detach from the line to mark and/or cover Turan. This provided numerical strength to the wide areas but also meant that Benzema was free- Miranda then followed, both detaching from the line. 
To reinforce how important the layering of the Midfield line is, in the above scenario Tiago (and Koke) had to take up deeper positions than Gabi so to potentially fill in and restore numerical strength to the line. The collaboration of the lines, with the trigger for man-marking worked fantastically well at staying balanced. 

This situation above is an important one for how Atletico defended in wide areas, which we will look at shortly. 

Defending switches of play, & spacing 

Real looked to circulate the ball quickly in attempt to isolate and overload either Juanfran of Felipe Luis. In the 2nd half especially, with the introduction of Gareth Bale for Real, Atleti adjusted the spacing between defenders to cope with this. 

If Bale went inside, Felipe Luis would narrow his distance to Godin, but if Bale hugged the line then Felipe Luis would increase the distance. 

Here we see how although the distance is great between the LB and nearside CB, the distances are very close between the rest of the line- this is because the nearside CB doesn't have to mark, but also because Real are attempting to create a 2v2/2v1 at the back post in the hope for an in-swinging cross. 
In this switch of play, Atleti were organised and were able to predict it which enabled Felipe Luis to get tight to Arbeloa before the switch was complete. 

We can see how aggressive Luis' man-marking was to Bale in how far he was able to detach from the line (defensive diagonal). This was of major importance to the Atletico defence as it prevented Bale with space and time to drive forward with the ball before cutting in on his left foot to shoot/cross. 
Notice the fantastic shape of the Midfield line to compensate for the large defensive diagonal. 

Put simply, if there are large distances between each defending in the line then it allows them to cover more of the pitch- which is important when playing against teams who seek to switch the play and create 1v1's. If an opponent is more focused on penetrating centrally, the distances need to be smaller.

Good distances allows for large spacing between FB/nearside CB. CM's can track/restore line.
Good distances allows for large spacing between FB/nearside CB. CM's can track/restore line.

Wide Trap 

The wide traps were a crucial part to Atletico's success in this fixture- and they are an important part of Cholosimo. 

As the units mirror one another's movements it allows for multiple double marking opportunities. 

The movements of Miranda/Gabi help create a 4v3 overload around the ball. Tiago is positioned to restore the defensive line if Ronaldo manages to cut in and attempt a cross/shot.

As seen before, with the assistance of the nearside Striker, Atleti can create a 3v3 in this wide area, but also double mark Ronaldo should the trap be broken.

4v3 around the ball, with Tiago as extra cover.
4v3 around the ball, with Tiago as extra cover.

Defending The Cross

The Midfield line were of huge importance to how Atletico defended the cross. They would retain close distances to the back four so that if a cross was delivered they could drop into the area and create a defensive overload- this enabled a higher chance to win both the 1st and 2nd ball.

Conclusion

Atleti's 4-4-2 proved flexible to the largely dynamic structure of Real's attacking play . Real possessed a large number of players who were potentially devastating in a variety of 1v1 situations, but with Simeone's tactics Los Rojiblancos were able to deny these scenarios are constantly outnumber Real Madrid in both central and wide areas. The units were incredibly well organised, with immaculate distances and cooperation between all lines.


A remarkable performance that should be celebrated for it's tactical organisation, skill, and effort as much as a victory focusing on total possession of the ball. 

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